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T
he Federal Reserve’s check clearing business has been a signiﬁcant part
of its operations since its founding and has set the precedent for other
payment services offered by the Federal Reserve (Fed) to depository
institutions. While there is considerable debate about the proper role for the
Fed in the modern payment system, there seems to be much less disagreement
concerning the Fed’s entry into check collection.1 Many scholars believe that
when the Fed took on the check payment function during the ﬁrst decade of the
institution’s existence, its entry served to enhance the efﬁciency of the check
payment system. Indeed, Fed documents on its role in the payment system
speak of the “breakdown of the check collection system” around the turn of
the century.2 According to the conventional view, check collection prior to the
founding of the Fed was decentralized and defective in a number of ways. By
centralizing the system, the Fed was able to eliminate many of the defects.
Our purpose in this article is to reexamine the facts concerning the Fed’s
entry into check clearing and to evaluate the conventional view in light of those
facts. We ﬁnd that the evidence of inefﬁciency in the pre-Fed check collection
system is inconclusive. Further, inefﬁciency would imply that there was some
form of market failure, yet most discussions of check clearing in the early part
of this century are vague or silent on possible sources of market failure. Absent
a clearly articulated explanation of why participants in the check collection
system failed to achieve efﬁcient results, we ﬁnd the conventional view to be
unconvincing.
The authors wish to thank Ned Prescott, John Walter, Alex Wolman, and Tom Humphrey for
helpful comments. The views expressed do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. The authors remain solely responsible for
the contents of this article.
1 See, for example, Benston and Humphrey (1997).
2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1990).
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We propose a different interpretation of the Fed’s entry, one based on the
network characteristics of check collection. Under this alternative view, pre-
Fed check collection arrangements were relatively efﬁcient, and the complaints
many observers voiced about the excessive costs of the pre-Fed system should
be understood as complaints about the distribution of the system’s costs rather
than about its aggregate costs. Moreover, this interpretation explains why the
founders felt compelled to give the Reserve Banks check clearing powers, given
the reserve requirements in the Federal Reserve Act. New light is also shed on
the par collection controversy, and the tortuous process, spanning several years,
by which the Reserve Banks established their check collection service. Hence,
the economics of network organization gives a coherent account of the facts
concerning check collection prior to the founding of the Fed and the process
by which the Fed entered the check clearing business.
Before presenting our view of the Fed’s entry into check clearing, we
present some of the key facts and review the conventional view. The relevant
facts concern the system before the Fed and the means by which the Fed became
a signiﬁcant provider of check clearing services. Section 1 discusses nonpar
remittance and the importance of correspondent relationships for clearing out-
of-town checks in the pre-Fed system. Nonpar remittance occurs when a bank
on which a check is drawn pays a collecting bank less than the par value of
the check. Correspondents are banks, usually larger city banks, that perform a
variety of services, including check collection, for other banks.
The Fed’s ability to successfully penetrate the check clearing market was
dependent on Congress giving it the proper authority. While the Federal Reserve
Act authorized the Reserve Banks to clear checks, the Fed’s initial attempts at
inducing fully voluntary participation by member banks were unsuccessful, as
we discuss in Section 2. It was not until Congress granted the Reserve Banks a
competitive advantage—the sole right to present by mail at par—that the Fed
was able to become a signiﬁcant participant in the market.
Sections 3 and 4 deal with the conventional view, according to which many
of the features of the correspondent banking system represent inefﬁciencies
that existed because of nonpar payment. Chief among these features was the
observation that occasionally a check would pass through the hands of many
widely dispersed intermediaries on its way to the paying bank. Such “circuitous
routing” is often cited as unambiguous evidence of inefﬁciency. However, cir-
cuitous routing is quite consistent with our alternative view of the pre-Fed
system as efﬁcient, as we discuss in Section 5. In Section 6 we reconsider the
Fed’s entry into check clearing in light of our alternative view. The Fed was
able to gain market share because it enjoyed a legal privilege in presentment
that was unavailable to private collecting banks. Exercising that privilege had
the effect of shifting the allocation of the common costs of check clearing away
from collecting banks and toward small country banks and taxpayers.       
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1. CHECK CLEARING BEFORE THE
FOUNDING OF THE FED
By the mid-nineteenth century, the use of checks had become a prominent
means of payment in American banking and commerce. As early as 1855,
the value of checkable deposits exceeded the value of bank notes in circula-
tion (Spahr 1926, p. 84). In this earlier period, however, there were distinct
geographic differences in payment practices. Checks were used primarily for
payments within cities, and notes were used predominantly in the countryside.3
Payments between the country and the city and across geographic regions were
made using bank drafts. A bank draft is like a check, except it is drawn on
an account held by one bank with another. Hence, a Midwesterner wishing
to make a purchase from an East Coast city would go to his local bank and
purchase a draft drawn on that bank’s balances held with a bank in an eastern
city.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, checks began to replace drafts
as means of payment in interregional transactions, a change that was nearly
complete by the turn of the century (Preston 1920, p. 566). During this same
period, the check also replaced the bank note as a means of payment among
people in the countryside. By 1900, the value of demand deposits was more
than quadruple the value of currency in circulation (Friedman and Schwartz
1963, p. 705). In the period just prior to the founding of the Fed, the check
had become a dominant payment instrument for making both long distance and
local payments.
Check clearing involves the delivery of items to the banks on which they
are drawn. Many observers have pointed out that, in the United States prior to
the existence of the Fed, clearing was affected by the different legal treatments
accorded to different forms of delivery.4 While a paying bank was obligated to
make payment (remit) at par for checks presented in person (over the counter),
there was no such obligation for checks presented through the mail.5 Banks
were free to extract a presentment fee (exchange charge) from their payments
on such indirect presentments. This practice of nonpar banking is the focus
of many discussions of the Fed’s entry into the check collection business. The
prospects of receiving less than par for a check gives a collecting bank an
incentive to ﬁnd a way of getting the check to the bank on which it is drawn
without mailing it directly. Alternative means of transport and presentment will
be used, presumably, if the total cost does not exceed the presentment fee.
3 Spahr (1926, p. 60); Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (1922, p. 1).
4 Spahr (1926, pp. 103–05); Baxter (1983, p. 559); Duprey and Nelson (1986, p. 20); Sum-
mers and Gilbert (1996, p. 4); Weinberg (1997, p. 38); Gilbert (1998, pp. 123, 129); James (1998,
p. 143).
5 See the discussion in Spahr (1926, pp. 103–04). The requirement that checks presented
over the counter be paid at par had its origins in English common law.      
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For a check drawn on a nearby bank, in-person presentment was rela-
tively cheap. Hence the clearing and settlement of local checks presented few
challenges for the banking system of the United States.6 In the larger cities
a number of banks typically would have frequent business with one another,
making it worthwhile for them to form cooperative clearing organizations such
as clearinghouses.7 In such an arrangement, the banks’ representatives would
meet daily at a designated location to exchange items drawn on each other,
avoiding the duplicative cost of bilateral contacts. By mutual agreement among
participants, presentment at the clearinghouse was taken to be equivalent to
presentment in person at the paying bank’s premises.8
In less densely populated areas, a typical bank had a relatively small num-
ber of banks nearby from which it regularly received checks. Maintaining a
clearinghouse arrangement among the smaller number of banks did not tend to
be economical. Instead, rural banks usually made direct exchanges with other
banks in the same general area (Spahr 1926, p. 98). Such direct presentations
were made once or twice a week, or daily, depending on the distance between
the banks and on the volume of checks ﬂowing between them. Settlement of
local checks, either in the city clearinghouses or among banks in rural commu-
nities, could be made through the exchange of currency or by debiting interbank
balances (Cannon 1900, pp. 36–46).
The clearing of out-of-town, or interregional, checks was accomplished
via a network of bilateral agreements on clearing terms that generally took
the form of correspondent banking relationships.9 This relationship involved a
bank in a larger city serving as a correspondent bank for a bank in a smaller
city or town. The latter bank, the respondent, would hold balances with its
correspondent. When the respondent received a check drawn on a bank in the
city or area where the correspondent conducted business, the respondent would
send the check to the correspondent, who would, in turn, present the check
directly to the paying bank. The correspondent would receive payment from
the paying bank and credit the amount to the respondent’s account. Often, the
correspondent would credit the respondent for the par value of the check even
if the paying bank did not remit at par (Spahr 1926, pp. 101, 111). Sometimes
the respondent agreed, in return, to remit at par on checks sent to it by its
correspondent. The correspondent’s main form of compensation was typically
the interest margin it could earn on the funds held as balances by the respondent
bank (Spahr 1926, pp. 101, 111–12). It was not uncommon for a correspondent
6 Spahr (1926, p. 98); Duprey and Nelson (1986, p. 19).
7 Cannon (1900, pp. 148–54); Spahr (1926, pp. 79–82).
8 Hallock (1903, p. 59); Spahr (1926, pp. 104–05).
9 For descriptions of correspondent banking at the Fed’s founding, see Watkins (1929,
Ch. 6), Spahr (1926, pp. 99–101).      
Lacker, Walker, Weinberg: Check Clearing Reconsidered 5
to pay presentment fees to its respondents while paying them par for all the
checks it collected for them.
Often a bank would act as correspondent for banks outside the region,
offering to collect checks drawn on any bank in the neighboring territory, with
the proceeds credited to the account of the distant bank. There appears to have
been active competition for collection business between correspondent banks,
as evidenced by the many advertisements in bank directories from the late
nineteenth century.10
The importance of correspondent relationships is reﬂected in the magnitude
of interbank balances. In the years preceding the Fed’s founding, the amount
of deposits at national banks that were held for other banks was roughly 40
percent as large as national bank deposits held for individuals (Watkins 1929,
pp. 10–18). These interbank balances were held predominantly at banks in the
larger cities and especially in the major ﬁnancial centers.
Correspondent banks, then, were linked together into a network of banks
through which checks were collected. When a bank received a check drawn
on an out-of-town correspondent bank—what might be termed a regular inter-
regional check—it would be presented through the established clearing arrange-
ment.11 When a bank received a check drawn on a distant bank with which it
did not have an established relationship—what might be termed an irregular
interregional check—the check would most likely be sent on to a correspondent.
If a correspondent received from a respondent a check drawn on a paying bank
with which the correspondent did not have a relationship, then the correspon-
dent would typically send the check to one of its correspondent banks located
near the paying bank.12 In fact, to aid routing, bank directories listed each
bank’s correspondents; the bank holding the check could look for correspon-
dents it shared with the paying bank.13 The next bank receiving the check might
present it directly to the paying bank. Such indirect routing had two advantages
for the correspondent. First, it avoided having to pay a presentment fee to a
paying bank from which it received no compensating beneﬁt. Second, it saved
the cost of sending a single item to the paying bank instead of bundling the
item with others being sent on a normal shipment (Cannon 1900, p. 76).
10 Williams (1901). Typical notices: “Prompt and careful attention given to collections
throughout Mississippi and Alabama” (First National Bank of Meridian, Mississippi); “Unsur-
passed facilities for handling collections, especially Oklahoma and Kansas” (Kansas National
Bank, Wichita, Kansas); “Send us your Southwest Collections” (Home Savings Bank & Trust
Co., Phoenix, Arizona).
11 The term “correspondent” is sometimes used narrowly to refer to a small number of distant
banks that a bank formally designates to receive items drawn on it. A bank typically had no more
than two or three correspondents in this sense, and they were listed in banking directories. The
term is often used more broadly, however, to refer to any bank with which a bank regularly
exchanges items by mail. We will use the term “correspondent” in this broader sense.
12 Cannon (1900, p. 76); Spahr (1926, pp. 111–12).
13 Williams (1901).     
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Irregular interregional items, then, were often handled by sending them to
banks with whom the correspondent conducted regular interregional business.
Concerns about the operation of the check clearing system prior to the founding
of the Fed focused largely on these irregular interregional checks. In such a
system, there were inevitably cases in which the next bank to receive a check
was not a correspondent of the paying bank. Hence, the process of sending the
check to a correspondent might be repeated more than once. Furthermore, some
mistakes in judgment and in handling of items were inevitable. Accordingly,
there are documented examples of checks traveling circuitous routes, through
the hands of many banks, in making their way from the bank of ﬁrst deposit
to the paying bank.14
Settlement of an irregular interregional check began when the paying bank
remitted to the bank that ﬁnally presented the check. If the presenting bank
was a correspondent for the paying bank, then settlement could be made by
debiting the paying bank’s account balances. If there was no account relation-
ship between the paying and presenting banks, then payment would typically
be made in the form of a draft on the paying bank’s account with one of its
correspondents, often a New York bank (most banks maintained a relationship
with at least one New York bank).15 The presenting bank could send the draft
to its New York correspondent who would credit the amount to the presenting
bank’s account. The presenting bank’s New York correspondent would, in turn,
present the draft to the paying bank’s correspondent through the New York
clearinghouse. In this way, New York reserve balances served increasingly as
a universal settlement medium. This use of bank drafts in settlement stands in
contrast to the greater use of specie earlier in the nineteenth century.16
Collecting and paying banks incurred a variety of expenses in the process
of clearing and settling interregional checks. The resource costs incurred by
collecting banks, including the costs of recordkeeping and postage, were esti-
mated to have amounted on average to about 3/4 of 1 percent to 1 percent of the
value of collected items (Spahr 1926, p. 113). Other costs borne by collecting
banks resulted from the negotiated arrangements for clearing and collection.
For instance, many collecting banks gave credit to their account holders at the
time of an item’s deposit. By doing so, the collecting bank would incur the
ﬂoat costs that accrued until settlement was received from the paying bank.
In addition, national banks faced a tax of 1/2 of 1 percent on deposits. These
costs, together with the presentment fee charged by some paying banks (1/8
of 1 percent on average), added roughly another 3/4 of 1 percent to the costs
incurred by collecting banks (Spahr 1926, p. 114). On the other side of the
14 We discuss the examples of circuitous routing below.
15 Cannon (1900, p. 46); Spahr (1926, p. 100); Watkins (1929, p. 104); Williams (1901,
passim). Alternatively, payment could be made in specie or banknotes.
16 Preston (1920, p. 565); Spahr (1926, pp. 45–51).       
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transaction, paying banks incurred clerical costs in receiving and remitting for
checks presented on them (Langston 1921, pp. 13–39).
It seems apparent that a substantial share of the cost of clearing inter-
regional checks was borne by collecting banks (Spahr 1926, p. 113). Customers
of collecting banks typically received the full par value for their deposits of
out-of-town checks. Even if the collecting bank passed along some charge to
the depositor of the check, there appears to be little evidence of systematic price
discrimination by businesses between customers paying for goods and services
with out-of-town checks and those paying by other means. Most observers
conclude that competition for both local deposits and correspondent business
drove city banks to absorb much of the cost of collecting country checks.17
2. THE FED’S ENTRY INTO CHECK CLEARING
A ﬂurry of banking and monetary reform proposals around the turn of the
century ultimately led to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act on December
23, 1913. The central motive of the Act, and many other reform proposals
as well, was to prevent recurrent ﬁnancial panics of the kind typical of the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in the United States. The Federal
Reserve System was designed to prevent such panics by providing “an elastic
currency” that allowed a relatively rapid expansion of the supply of notes when
needed.18
Nationwide Federal Reserve check clearing was not envisioned in the earli-
est versions of the Act introduced in Congress.19 The bill introduced by Senator
Carter Glass in February 1913, for example, required Reserve Banks to accept
from their members at par any checks drawn on any other member’s deposit
at a Reserve Bank. This would have allowed member banks to settle obliga-
tions to other member banks with checks drawn on their own Reserve Bank
deposits, much the way interbank obligations were settled using drafts drawn
on bank deposits at New York banks. Ultimately, however, the ﬁnal version of
the Federal Reserve Act allowed Reserve Bank check clearing. Each Reserve
Bank was required to accept checks written by depositors at member banks,
and was permitted, though not required, to accept checks written by depositors
at member banks of other Reserve Banks.20
17 Watkins (1929, p. 106); Fellows (1940, p. 18); Miller (1949, p. 11); Duprey and Nelson
(1986, p. 20); Summers and Gilbert (1996, p. 4).
18 See Willis (1923) or Timberlake (1978), for example.
19 See Stevens (1996) for an account of the legislative history of the check clearing provisions
of the Federal Reserve Act.
20 Board of Governors (1915, pp. 23–44). Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act as ﬁnally
passed on December 23, 1913, stated, in part, “Every Federal reserve bank shall receive on
deposit at par from member banks or from Federal reserve banks checks and drafts drawn upon
any of its depositors, and when remitted by a Federal reserve bank, checks and drafts drawn by       
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It was a number of years before the Reserve Banks successfully penetrated
the check collection business. On March 4, 1915, the Federal Reserve Board
announced that it had directed the Reserve Banks to establish a “voluntary
reciprocal plan” for intradistrict check clearing.21 Member banks would be
able to collect at par from all other member banks in their district that joined
the plan. A member bank joining the plan had to agree to accept their own
checks at par. Details of the scheme were left up to the individual Reserve
Banks. The hope was that many member banks would join, making the plan
attractive to those that at ﬁrst held out. The voluntary reciprocal plan proved
disappointing, however. By late July the Reserve Banks were reporting that
most banks said they would not join unless the plan were made mandatory.
Reported participation in the plan peaked in October 1915 at only 2,456 banks,
out of about 7,600 member banks, and withdrawals exceeded additions every
month thereafter.22
A new plan was introduced early the next year. On May 1, 1916, the
Federal Reserve Board released a circular to member banks—Circular No. 1,
Series of 1916—detailing a “compulsory plan” to be put into effect in June
(later postponed to July 15).23 Member banks would now be required to pay
at par on checks presented to them by their Reserve Bank. Presentation by
a Reserve Bank through the mail would be construed as presentation at their
counters. The Reserve Bank would defray the paying bank’s cost of sending
payment, either in notes or acceptable checks on other banks, if the bank’s re-
serve balance was insufﬁcient. Each Reserve Bank would accept checks from
any depositor in any other Federal reserve bank or member bank upon funds to the credit of
said depositor in said reserve bank or member bank. Thus each Reserve Bank was required to
accept on deposit at par from member banks or other Reserve Banks checks and drafts drawn
upon any of its depositors. Section 16 went on to state, “The Federal Reserve Board . . . may at
its discretion exercise the functions of a clearing house for such Federal reserve banks, or may
designate a Federal reserve bank to exercise such functions, and may also require each bank to
exercise the functions of a clearing house for its member banks.” Section 13 adds that “Any
Federal Reserve Bank may receive from any of its member banks . . . checks and drafts upon
solvent member banks, payable upon presentation; or solely for exchange purposes, may receive
from other Federal reserve banks . . . checks and drafts upon solvent member or Federal reserve
banks, payable upon presentation.” Thus each Reserve Bank was permitted to accept from its
member banks checks or drafts drawn upon solvent member banks, or, “solely for exchange
purposes,” checks or drafts from other Federal Reserve Banks drawn upon solvent member banks
or other Federal Reserve Banks.
21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin (1915, pp.
6–9) [hereafter “Federal Reserve Bulletin”].
22 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1915, pp. 192–95); Spahr (1926, pp. 174).
23 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1916, pp. 259–60, 262–64). Each Reserve Bank issued its own
circular detailing the operation of the plan in its district; Chicago’s is reprinted in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin (1916, pp. 312–14). Regulation J was released later in 1916, incorporating the
September 7, 1916, amendment (see below) and superceding Circular No. 1. To this day Regu-
lation J codiﬁes the Board’s requirement that member banks accept checks at par (see Board of
Governors [1998], 12 CFR 210.9).      
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its member banks at par if they were drawn on other member banks or on
nonmember banks that paid at par, although a small per-item service charge
was allowed.24 The plan was nationwide in scope; each Reserve Bank would
accept at par checks drawn on banks in other districts if they were Federal
Reserve members or they agreed to pay at par. Member banks were still free to
collect checks outside of the Federal Reserve System as they saw ﬁt, and they
were free to carry balances with other banks for purposes of clearing. They
were still free to charge presentment fees as well, but the Board’s Circular
prevented them from charging presentment fees to the Reserve Banks.
The original Federal Reserve Act did not permit the Reserve Banks to ac-
cept checks drawn upon nonmembers. Early in 1916 the Board recommended
to Congress various changes in the Act, including alteration of Section 13 of
the Act to allow Reserve Banks to accept “checks and drafts payable upon
presentation within its district.”25 The amendment passed without change on
September 7, 1916. The amendment also removed the qualiﬁcation that Reserve
Banks could only accept checks drawn on “solvent” banks, further expanding
the ﬁeld of acceptable checks. The Fed’s strategy was to make the service as
attractive as possible by increasing the number of banks on which they could
collect.26
Although nonmember banks still could not deposit checks directly with the
Reserve Banks, they were entitled to send checks to the Fed through their cor-
respondents that were member banks, and many apparently did (Spahr 1926, p.
197). The Board viewed the inability to accept checks directly from nonmember
banks as an impediment to the success of the compulsory plan: “Any clearing
and collection plan to be effective must be so comprehensive as to include
all checks.”27 The Reserve Bank check collection service was at ﬁrst intended
as a beneﬁt of membership, but the Board decided that it would be better to
offer clearing services to nonmembers to entice them to remit at par on checks
sent to them by the Reserve Banks through the mail. As part of a package
of suggested amendments sent to the Congress in December 1916, the Board
included an amendment to Section 16 that would permit nonmember banks to
use the Fed’s clearing service, provided they agreed to pay their own checks at
par and kept a “compensating balance” with the Reserve Bank. The amount of
the compensating balance was to be determined by the Federal Reserve Board.
24 The Board’s circular stipulated that Reserve Banks keep an accurate account of the cost
of the clearing service and that the Board would ﬁx the charge by rule. Charges ranged from 0.9
cents to 2.0 cents per item. Charges were ultimately lowered and then abolished on July 1, 1918
(Spahr 1926, pp. 192–93, 211).
25 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1916, pp. 323–24).
26 In discussing the compulsory plan in June 1916, the Board said “it is thought that in the
near future checks upon practically all banks throughout the United States can be handled at par
by Federal Reserve Banks” (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1916, p. 263).
27 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1917, p. 100).      
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Congress ultimately enacted the suggested check clearing provisions, but
not without a ﬁght that revealed the depth of opposition to the Fed’s check col-
lection plans.28 After being called back into session in April, Congress again
took up the Board’s suggested amendments. Representatives of the American
Bankers Association took the opportunity to lobby for a bank’s right to charge
presentment fees, even against the Reserve Banks. As a result, Senator Hard-
wick of Georgia introduced an amendment that would have added to Section
16 the proviso that nothing in the Act shall be construed as prohibiting a
member or nonmember bank from “making reasonable charges, but in no case
to exceed 10 cents per $100 . . . for collection or payment of checks and
drafts. . . .”29 As drafted, the Hardwick Amendment would have effectively
negated the provision of Circular No. 1 requiring banks participating in the
compulsory plan to pay at par on checks sent by the Reserve Banks through
the mail.
The Hardwick Amendment was ruled out of order in the House, where
the Board’s suggested amendments were passed on May 5. The Senate then
approved the bill but included the Hardwick Amendment, despite the opposition
of the Federal Reserve Board. In conference, Glass prevailed upon the conferees
to modify the Amendment in two ways. The Federal Reserve Board was given
the authority to determine and regulate the charges, and a clause was added
stating that “no such charges shall be made against the Federal reserve banks.”
The House passed the resulting bill, as did the Senate, after the reading of a
letter from President Wilson that described the original Hardwick Amendment
“as most unfortunate and as almost destructive of the function of the Federal
reserve banks as a clearing house for member banks.”30 The Board’s ban on
charging presentment fees against Reserve Banks was now law.31
As part of the compulsory plan, the Board directed Reserve Banks to main-
tain so-called “par lists” consisting of the nonmember banks in their districts
that accepted checks at par. The par list and the Fed’s campaign for universal
par presentment became the center of the celebrated “par collection contro-
versy” (see Spahr [1926], Ch. 7). At ﬁrst, only banks that explicitly agreed
to remit at par were added to the System’s list, but in early 1919 a concerted
effort was begun to expand the list. Reserve Banks took aggressive measures to
28 See Spahr (1926, p. 200) and Wyatt (1944).
29 A contemporary account of the legislative action appears in “The Hardwick Amendment”
(1917, pp. 40–41).
30 Miller (1949, p. 20); Congressional Record (1917, p. 3761).
31 At the request of the Federal Reserve Board, the Attorney General issued an opinion on
the scope of the new language in Section 13. He said that the Federal Reserve had no power to
regulate the exchange charges of nonmember banks who were not depositors under the clearing
system, and if nonmembers insisted on making charges, the Reserve Banks could not handle
checks drawn on them, since Section 13 now prohibited such charges (Federal Reserve Bulletin
1918, pp. 367–70).       
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attempt to collect at par on all banks in their districts.32 Some Reserve Banks
put recalcitrant banks on the par list without their explicit permission; they
accumulated their checks and had them presented directly over the counter,
where banks were generally required to pay par.33 The nonmember par list
grew from about 10,000 in December 1918 to over 19,000 at the high-water
mark in November 1920, leaving only about 1,700 nonpar banks.34
The opposition to the Federal Reserve’s methods was ﬁerce in some quar-
ters, however. Some banks refused to cooperate, and the resulting litigation—
including cases that reached the Supreme Court—established limits on the
measures the Reserve Banks could employ to obtain par remittance.35 Checks
could no longer be accumulated for presentation at the counter to “coerce”
banks into paying par. Banks could pay checks at their counter by draft rather
than lawful money. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Reserve
was under no congressional mandate to bring about universal par clearance. In
response, the Board ordered the Reserve Banks to cease using agents other
than banks in making collections and to stop accepting checks drawn on non-
par banks.36 Banks withdrew from the par list until nonpar banks numbered
nearly 4,000.37 Nonpar banking persisted thereafter, chieﬂy in small one-bank
towns or in small towns with only nonpar banks.38 The number of nonpar banks
declined sharply in the early 1970s and ﬁnally sank to zero in 1980.39
3. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW
Many payments system researchers have described the pre-Federal Reserve
check collection system as inefﬁcient in the sense that real resource costs were
higher than they would have been under a centrally run system. Likewise, it
is conventionally argued that the Fed-imposed clearing arrangements resulted
in lower real resource costs than private arrangements. Walter Spahr (1926)
32 See Harding (1921); Tippetts (1924, pp. 635–36); Tippetts (1929, pp. 277–80); Preston
(1920, pp. 571–78).
33 Under some state laws, however, the bank was not required to pay in legal tender but
could pay instead with a draft. See Spahr (1926, pp. 284–86).
34 Spahr (1926, p. 248) displays data compiled from various issues of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin.
35 The major cases are described in Spahr (1926, pp. 249–82, 284–86) and Tippetts (1924,
1929). The key decision came in the “Richmond case,” Farmers and Merchants National Bank of
Monroe, North Carolina, et al. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Virginia, in which the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a North Carolina law that authorized state banks
to charge a presentment fee of no more than 1/8 of 1 percent and speciﬁcally allowed payment
by draft for checks presented over the counter by a Federal Reserve Bank, post ofﬁce, or express
company.
36 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1923, pp. 903–04, 1194).
37 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1928, p. 535).
38 Stevens (1998, p. 19); Jessup (1967, p. 26).
39 The reasons for the decline of nonpar banking have not, to our knowledge, been studied.     
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compiled the most comprehensive and widely cited statement of this view 12
years after the founding of the Federal Reserve. Most recent proponents of the
conventional view echo Spahr.
Spahr claimed that one of the most serious problems with the pre-Fed
system was the excessive cost of collecting country checks and that nonpar
checking was to blame. The practice of nonpar checking had its origins in
earlier times when banks incurred signiﬁcant shipping costs in remitting specie
to distant banks for settlement. The amount of the charges had been steadily de-
clining during the 50 years immediately prior to the Fed as transportation costs
fell; nevertheless, nonpar remittance practices remained a signiﬁcant source of
revenue to some country banks and a signiﬁcant source of irritation to some
city banks in 1914. The most widespread criticism of exchange charges was
that technological advances had removed most of the country banks’ settlement
costs, eliminating the once-valid justiﬁcation for the fees. Spahr describes the
fees as “excessive” and out of proportion to the costs incurred by the levying
banks (Spahr 1926, p. 241).
Besides imposing excessive costs, presentment fees were said to cause
costly and inefﬁcient collection practices. Chief among these was circuitous
routing: some checks were sent to banks in roundabout ways through a number
of different banks in order to avoid presentment fees, resulting in excessive
postage and clerical costs and extended check ﬂoat. Although there are no data
on the extent of circuitous routing to avoid exchange charges, the literature con-
tains a number of examples. Cannon (1900) describes an example of a check
drawn on The Peconic Bank of Sag Harbor, Long Island, and deposited in a
bank in Hoboken, New Jersey. The now-famous check traveled from the Hobo-
ken bank to a New York City bank, and then to banks in Boston, Tonawanda,
Albany, Port Jefferson, Far Rockaway, New York City (again, but a different
bank), Riverhead, and Brooklyn, before ﬁnally arriving at the Sag Harbor bank.
James Hallock (1903) cites the Sag Harbor check and three others as well. Spahr
(1926) cites the Sag Harbor check, Hallock’s Stonington, Connecticut, check,
plus two additional examples. Other writers typically cite Cannon’s Sag Harbor
check.40
Most of the pre-Fed writers on check clearing were city bankers; there
is almost no early academic literature on the subject. Nonetheless, virtually
all authors around that time supported the thrust of Spahr’s argument. In his
1890 annual report, the Comptroller of the Currency conveys an early ofﬁcial
opinion on exchange charges by saying a conservative estimate of their total
amount “would constitute a heavy burden upon the commercial interests of
the country.” Hallock (1903, p. 17) asserts that the “avoidance of collection
40 See, for example, Conway and Patterson (1914, p. 324), Miller (1949, p. 10), or Baxter
(1983, p. 560).       
Lacker, Walker, Weinberg: Check Clearing Reconsidered 13
charges is the motive for shunting a check up and down the country” and
that “the practice is not unusual.” Oliver Sprague (1910, p. 42) observes that
“collections and payments are subject to delay and involve heavy expense.”
Similarly, turn-of-the-century Banker’s Magazine and A.B.A. Journal articles,
some of which Spahr references in his book, conﬁrm the common perception
that bankers saw a need for reform. An array of historical descriptions of the
U.S. payments system written since 1914 have either referenced or endorsed
Spahr’s evaluation of the pre-Fed clearing system.41
Many of the founders of the Federal Reserve System shared Spahr’s as-
sessment. In a debate prior to the Federal Reserve Act, Carter Glass revealed
that he thought centralized clearing by the government would reallocate costs
in a welfare-improving way:
Precisely how much difﬁculty and cost will be incurred by the Federal Re-
serve Banks in carrying out the provisions of this section cannot be precisely
calculated. It can, however, be positively stated that such expenditures will be
very much less than those incurred by banks at the present day in carrying
through their exchanges. The proposed provision will eliminate the numerous
and well-founded complaints of unjust charges for exchange; and, while it
will prevent certain banks from proﬁting as they do by exchange transactions
it will correspondingly beneﬁt the community.42
Glass expresses the idea here that although exchange-charging country banks
will be made worse off, a Federal Reserve clearing system will make others
better off by lowering their clearing costs. He appears to have in mind the
proposition that aggregate costs will be lower overall, and thus the commu-
nity will beneﬁt. H. Parker Willis, Glass’s advisor and the ﬁrst Secretary to
the Federal Reserve Board, made similar criticisms of the old system in his
post-1914 works. For example, Willis wrote the lead article in the March 1914
American Economic Review on the new Federal Reserve legislation and referred
to exchange charges as “extortion.”43
41 For example, Conway and Patterson (1914) explain the “disadvantages” of the old meth-
ods, highlighting circuitous routing, excessive exchange charges, and unnecessary check ﬂoat.
Gidney (1916, p. 607) states, “Important economies are expected to be effected in the total cost
of check collection, through having checks reach the paying bank by a reasonably direct route and
after having passed through relatively few banks. . . .” Kemmerer (1928) describes a “defective
exchange and transfer system,” adding “large shipments of currency” as another inefﬁciency.
Tippetts (1929) gives a similar account, calling the system “the source of a number of evils.”
Watkins (1929) emphasizes that exchange charges “operated under the old system to lessen its
efﬁciency” and goes on to argue that such charges caused unduly large bankers’ balances. See
also Miller (1949), Jessup (1967), Duprey and Nelson (1986), and Moore (1990).
42 U.S. Congress, House (1913) pp. 55–56.
43 For Willis’s opinion on Spahr (1926) and Cannon (1900), see Willis, et al. (1933), p. 238.
W. P. G. Harding, then Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, stated that “the establishment of a
universal country wide par-collection system” would result in the “elimination of the burdensome
delays and expenses incident to the old indirect routing system” (Harding 1921, p. 338).       
14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
In the conventional view, the Fed’s entry was a struggle by the progressive
forces of banking reform against the vested interests of nonpar bankers. Duprey
and Nelson (1986, p. 18) write:
At the turn of the century . . . the private banking sector was widely acknowl-
edged to have produced an inefﬁcient and counterproductive arrangement for
collecting checks beyond the local level. The invisible hand wasn’t working.
This failure to produce an adequate solution for collecting out-of-town checks
efﬁciently was one reason that the Congress, as part of its banking reform
measures developed between 1908 and 1913, gave the Federal Reserve System
both a regulatory role and an operating role in check clearing and collection.
They go on to argue that the Fed’s quest for a universal par clearance system
was frustrated by “stiff opposition and competition” from the correspondent
banking system.44 Nonetheless, the Fed did enjoy “some success in improving
the efﬁciency of intercommunity check collection”—the Fed reduced the num-
ber of nonpar banks “and probably helped limit abuses” in their practices.
Summers and Gilbert (1996), drawing on Spahr, note “widespread dissat-
isfaction” with the settlement of interregional transactions pre-Fed and cite
enhancing payment system efﬁciency as an important purpose for creating the
Federal Reserve. In a similar vein, Gilbert (1998) concludes that, based on the
fall in reserve holdings at banks joining the system, “evidence from the period
when the Fed was founded suggests that the Fed’s services improved payments
system efﬁciency.”45
4. A PROBLEM WITH THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW
One reason to question the conventional view is that (with only a few excep-
tions) most writers do not explain why the participants in the check collection
system were unable to implement efﬁciency improvements, if they were avail-
able. In other words, it is not clear why there would be a market failure in check
44 Duprey and Nelson (1986, p. 19).
45 Gilbert (1998, p. 137). One view which we do not discuss at length here is that Congress
wanted the Fed to collect checks in order to prevent disruptions in check collection that ac-
companied ﬁnancial panics, like the one in 1907 that occasioned widespread suspension of cash
payments at banks (Corrigan 1983, pp. 345–48). While preventing ﬁnancial panics was clearly
the central motive behind the provisions moving reserve accounts over to the Reserve Banks, we
know of no evidence that any of the founders perceived the functioning of the check collection
system during panics, per se, as a motive for granting check clearing powers to the Reserve
Banks. Moreover, it is hard to see why the rediscounting and open market powers of the Reserve
Banks should not be sufﬁcient to prevent ﬁnancial disruption. Walter (1988, p. 57) reports that in
congressional debate on the Federal Reserve Act there is no mention of the Fed providing check
collection services to produce a safer payment system. “Senator Bristow and O. M. W. Sprague
agreed, in an exchange during Senate hearings, that the problems with inter-city check collection
during panics were caused by a lack of a lender of last resort” (U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency 1913, pp. 512–13), cited in Walter (1988).      
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collection. One might argue that it was beyond the capability of participants
to create the Federal Reserve’s clearing system, since the Fed is a collective
nonproﬁt institution.46 And yet the Reserve Bank’s check collection activities
employed precisely the same technology and organizational techniques em-
ployed by the private sector. The Reserve Banks were essentially correspondent
banks for the members of their clearing system, and their relationship with their
respondents was organized in essentially the same way as private correspondent
relationships. The Reserve Banks did set up a wire transfer system for moving
funds rapidly between Reserve Banks, but private banks had been moving funds
via wire transfer prior to the founding of the Fed (Langston 1921, pp. 168–72).
Private clearinghouses were collective nonproﬁt institutions set up by
banks, often endowed with quasi-regulatory power over their members.47 In
fact, in the decades prior to the founding of the Fed, clearinghouses were
making moves to expand their clearing activities to encompass checks drawn
on country banks.48 The Boston clearinghouse had been clearing New England
country checks for years.49 In short, banks could have set up the equivalent of
the Federal Reserve Bank clearing system on their own. Presumably they would
have done so if it would have made some participants better off without making
others worse off—for example, if it would have appreciably lowered the costs
of collecting checks. The fact that they did not do so seems to suggest that it
would not have lowered costs. If the Reserve Bank clearing system lowered
check clearing costs, why couldn’t the private sector do the same?
Some believe one possible answer is that nonpar country banks enjoyed
monopoly power. Presentment fees were set inefﬁciently high in order to ex-
tract rents from collecting banks. Such fees, it is said, “can lead to costly
and complicated countermeasures” to avoid nonpar transactions.50 This view
envisions a bank facing a choice between mailing directly to a nonpar bank
with which it does not have a correspondent relationship and sending the check
on to a correspondent who can present it at par. But it is not clear that this
was always the case. In fact, presentment fees were often paid to nonpar banks
by their correspondents. These collecting banks appeared to pay fees will-
ingly in exchange for the respondent banks’ reserve balances (Spahr 1926, p.
111). Hence, presentment fees were often voluntarily agreed to as a compo-
nent of a broader correspondent-respondent relationship. It is not clear how to
46 Duprey and Nelson (1986) seem to advocate this position when they argue that “well-
established rivalries” between city and country banks somehow prevented banks from voluntarily
agreeing to a mutually beneﬁcial national clearing system.
47 Gorton (1985); Gorton and Mullineaux (1987).
48 Cannon (1900); Hallock (1903); Spahr (1926, pp. 119–30); Duprey and Nelson (1986, pp.
22–23).
49 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1916, p. 317). The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston took over
the operations of the Boston clearinghouse by unanimous consent in 1916.
50 McAndrews (1995, p. 56). See also Gilbert (1998).       
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reconcile this market power view with the documented features of correspon-
dent relationships.
Check collection routes were determined by the pattern of correspondent
relationships. Thus, it is the market for correspondent relationships—as opposed
to the market for the clearance of a particular check—that is relevant to the
question of market power. What a country bank had to offer as a respondent—
reserve balances—was available from other country banks as well. It appears
unlikely that small country banks exercised any monopoly power in the market
for correspondent relationships.
5. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
The conventional view sees the pre-Fed check collection system as inefﬁcient
and disjointed, with much of the inefﬁciency being driven by the practice
of nonpar remittance. An alternative interpretation is possible if we view the
check collection system as a whole and focus on its network characteristics.51
While such terms as “network effect” or “network externality” are used widely
by economists in reference to a variety of market settings, a check collection
system (or any other payment clearing system) literally is a communication net-
work. Two key characteristics are central to understanding the organization and
performance of network communications industries: joint beneﬁts and common
costs.
For most goods, a unit of consumption provides beneﬁts to a single user.
Some other goods or services provide simultaneous beneﬁts to many people.
For most such goods, a musical performance for example, one person’s utility
does not depend on whether anyone else is partaking. One unit of a communi-
cation service, however, necessarily involves two “consumers”: a sender and a
receiver. Neither party derives a beneﬁt from communication unless the other
one does. Similarly, the clearing of a check provides beneﬁts jointly to both the
payor and the payee. Note that the presence of joint beneﬁts affects the criterion
for judging whether provision of a unit of a good is economically efﬁcient. For
an ordinary good, we would say that a unit’s provision is efﬁcient if the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay exceeds the incremental resource costs of the good. For a
network communication service, we would say that the provision of a unit of
service is efﬁcient if the sum of the willingness-to-pay of the sender and the
receiver (or payor and payee in the case of a payment instrument) exceeds the
incremental cost.52
51 For a discussion of the characteristics of network services as applied to payment systems,
see Weinberg (1997) and Lacker and Weinberg (1998). James McAndrews (1995) ﬁrst suggested
that check collection at the founding of the Fed should be viewed as a network communications
industry, analogous to credit card and ATM clearing networks. See also Summers and Gilbert
(1996, pp. 6–7).
52 This distinction is emphasized by Baxter (1983).     
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The fact that check clearing services provide joint beneﬁts to pairs of users
implies that there are common costs even at the level of the individual unit
of service. Common costs are costs that cannot be uniquely attributed to the
provision of service to particular users or groups of users. The incremental
cost of a unit of a payment clearing service is common to the payor and
payee in that it cannot be uniquely attributed to either. In network services
markets, common costs tend to exist at a variety of levels. The technology for
such services often includes substantial ﬁxed infrastructure costs. The physical
transport of items such as checks involves common costs since the cost of a
trip cannot be attributed to particular items or particular pairs of senders and
receivers. Many common costs in such markets are ﬁxed relative to the quantity
of a service provided. For example, the cost of a transportation node facility,
such as a terminal, or (in the case of checks) a bank branch, often cannot be
uniquely attributed to any particular item passing through it.
The presence of substantial common costs implies that it is impossible to
specify precisely an individual user’s share of total costs. Consequently, there
is some ambiguity in determining the “right” price for a particular user to face.
Efﬁciency requires that no individual or group pay less than its incremental
cost, deﬁned as the cost of extending service to the group in question given the
level of services provided to all other users. Otherwise they might inefﬁciently
overuse the service.53 If all users pay incremental cost, however, the service
will not recover all of the costs that are common across groups of users. In
order to cover common costs, the service must charge some users more than
their incremental cost. There are often many ways to allocate common costs,
all of which are consistent with efﬁcient provision of the service.54
The presence of joint beneﬁts and common costs gives rise to what are
often called “network effects.” One person’s participation in a network brings
beneﬁts to that person as well as to all others who wish to communicate with
him. It is important to note, however, that while these beneﬁts may be ex-
ternal to the individual’s action, they are internal to the network in which he
participates. A network’s participants, as a group, may have an incentive to
shift common costs away from some individual participants: those who place
53 This principle must be modiﬁed in the presence of joint beneﬁts: see discussion on the
next page.
54 We use the term “efﬁcient” in the sense of Pareto efﬁciency. An allocation is Pareto efﬁ-
cient if no party can be made better off without making some other party worse off. Some readers
may be familiar with the Ramsey cost allocation principle, which states that each price charged
by a multi-product provider should be set at a markup over costs that is inversely proportional
to demand elasticity. This would appear to prescribe a uniquely efﬁcient allocation of common
costs. The Ramsey allocation is optimal, however, only under a particular assumption about the
way in which social beneﬁts are calculated, speciﬁcally, by adding up the utilities of individual
agents. The Pareto criterion is less restrictive, and there will tend to be multiple Pareto efﬁcient
allocations.      
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a relatively low private value on participation but who bring large external
beneﬁts to other participants. Efﬁcient participation may even require that an
individual pay less than their incremental cost.
To be more precise, consider an existing network whose incremental cost
of adding a particular new member is cn, while the mutual beneﬁt to existing
members of adding this new member is vn. For the potential new member, the
corresponding incremental costs and beneﬁts are ci and vi. It is efﬁcient to add
this member if vn + vi > cn + ci. Suppose that the network charges the new
member the price p. The new member is willing to participate if vi > ci + p.
The network is willing to add the new member if vn +p > cn. Thus, any price
satisfying vi ¡ ci > p > cn ¡ vn induces efﬁcient participation. Note that if
vi ¡ci < cn, then the network must charge less than the network’s incremental
cost of adding the new member, because the new member’s private net beneﬁt
from joining is low. Participation is efﬁcient nonetheless because of the value,
vn, the member brings to the network. Since the new member’s participation
in the network brings joint beneﬁts to all network participants, both cn and ci
are common costs. The price determines who bears the common costs.
6. PRE-FED CHECK CLEARING
When seen in terms of the allocation of the common costs of a network service,
a very different view of the pre-Fed check collection system emerges. The cen-
terpiece of the conventional view is the practice of nonpar collection and the
resulting circuitous routing of checks. The level of presentment fees, however,
helps determine the allocation of the common costs of check collection. More-
over, circuitous routing is not obviously wasteful, given the common costs of
shipping check bundles. And complaints about excessive costs appear to be
motivated by dissatisfaction with the allocation of costs among participants
rather than the overall level of aggregate costs.
Correspondent banking relationships were central to the clearing of checks
before the founding of the Fed and can be understood quite clearly in terms
of common costs. The correspondent relationship bundled together a number
of distinct functions: the respondent used the correspondent to clear checks
drawn on banks in the vicinity of or that had relationships with the correspon-
dent; the correspondent presented checks drawn on the respondent; and the
respondent held balances with the correspondent, which were used to settle
clearings in either direction (Spahr 1926, p. 111). Settlement via interbank bal-
ances has clear advantages over settlement by remittance of specie or exchange
draft, since the common cost of correspondent balances serves both investment
and settlement functions (Watkins 1929, pp. 3–5). Holding balances with a
bank in a ﬁnancial center, where they could earn interest, was preferable to
holding sterile reserves in the vault. Combining several items into a single     
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shipment saved shipping costs. Selecting a limited number of correspondents
was advantageous because it economized on the ﬁxed costs associated with
any given relationship; bilateral clearing and settlement arrangements with the
universe of depository institutions would obviously be far too costly. The over-
all advantage of a correspondent relationship is that certain common costs are
spread among a number of distinct payment services rather than duplicated
across multiple service providers.
Presentment fees can be easily understood as a means of allocating com-
mon costs. The presentment fee was the price paid to the paying bank for
accepting presentment by mail rather than over the counter, where the paying
bank was obligated to pay at par. Presentments, whether over the counter or
by mail, were generally paid by debits to correspondent balances or by drafts.
Mailing drafts to presenting banks involved postage costs, and so for some
checks there was a positive incremental cost to the paying bank of accepting
mail presentment. Otherwise the paying bank was largely indifferent about
the means by which checks arrived for payment (Spahr 1926, pp. 99–101).
In terms of our earlier notation, interpreted here as the incremental beneﬁts
and costs of accepting presentment by mail rather than over the counter, vi was
approximately zero and ci was slightly positive. A collecting bank, on the other
hand, was likely to place considerable value on having a means to avoid the real
resource costs of making over-the-counter presentments at long distances. Thus
we would expect a large value for ¡cn, the positive cost savings associated
with mail presentment to country banks. Apart from costs, the collecting bank
should be relatively indifferent about means of presentment, so vn should be
approximately zero as well.
If q is the presentment fee, then using our earlier notation, q = ¡p.
With this change of variables, the condition for efﬁcient participation is now
ci ¡vi < q < vn ¡cn. The presentment fee must exceed the paying banks’ cost
of participating, net of beneﬁts, ci¡vi > 0. Similarly, the presentment fee must
not exceed vn¡cn ¼¡ cn > 0, the net incremental beneﬁt to the collecting bank
of adding the paying bank to the mail presentment network. The net beneﬁt of
switching to mail presentment is vn +vi ¡cn ¡ci ¼¡ cn ¡ci, which is positive
when the cost savings to the presenting bank, ¡cn, exceeds the incremental
cost to the paying bank, ci. It seems likely that for many country checks, direct
presentment was more costly than postage for remittance, and therefore mail
presentment was economically efﬁcient.
Under the property rights inherent in the pre-Fed check clearing, the paying
bank was free to choose the presentment fee q. In this setting one would predict
that paying banks would set q as high as possible. We therefore should have ob-
served q = ¡cn, presentment fees equal to the collecting bank’s net willingness             
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to pay to avoid over-the-counter presentment.55 For checks drawn on country
banks the cost savings associated with mail presentment were substantial, and
thus ¡cn was large. When the paying bank was nearby, the resource cost
of over-the-counter presentment was likely to be quite low, and the collecting
bank’s willingness to pay for mail presentment would be correspondingly small.
This is consistent with country bank presentment fees that are close to the cost
to collecting banks of making a direct presentment through an agent or an
express company, and the general absence of presentment fees in the city. The
presentment fee effectively passes the collecting bank’s cost savings on to the
country paying bank as an inducement to participate via mail presentment. All
of the joint beneﬁts of mail presentment, ¡cn¡ci = q¡ci, accrue to the paying
bank.
Although some banks complained that presentment fees exceeded the direct
outlays of the paying bank for remittance (postage, the cost of exchange, and so
on),56 there is no economic efﬁciency reason why they should not. It is clearly
possible for the presentment fee to exceed ci, the paying bank’s direct outlays
for remittance, without violating the condition for efﬁcient participation. Thus
presentment fees that are “excessive” in this sense are not necessarily evidence
of monopoly power as some have claimed.57
Did the system in fact economize on the costs of moving checks? Much
of the commentary on this topic has argued the contrary, based on well-
documented instances of circuitous routing. But it is not at all obvious that the
examples of circuitous routing constitute strong evidence of excessive costs.
Cannon (1900, p. 76), commenting on the famous Sag Harbor check, writes
that
The reason why banks forward checks in this apparently unreasonable way,
often getting the items far out of their regular course, is easy to explain. It
sometimes appears cheaper to the one who has the check in hand to enclose it
with other items to some regular correspondent, who, assumedly, is nearer the
bank on which the check is drawn, than to hunt up a special correspondent
for it alone.
This reasoning suggests that the cost comparison implicit in the conventional
interpretation of the circuitous routing examples is not the relevant one. The
appropriate comparison for the bank holding the check is between the cost of
sending the item directly to the paying bank (or a “special correspondent” for
this check alone) and the cost of including the item with a batch of checks
being sent to an established correspondent in the hope that the correspondent
55 An alternative property rights regime in which collecting banks were entitled to mail pre-
sentment at par would result in q = ci ¡ vi. In this case the cost savings from mail presentment
would accrue to the collecting banks rather than to the paying banks.
56 Spahr (1926, p. 240–43).
57 Stevens (1998), for example.      
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would be better able to get the check to its ultimate destination. For an irregular
check—one drawn on a bank with whom one does not have a correspondent
relationship—the incremental cost of sending the check directly to the paying
bank would include the postage on the letter, along with the cost of preparing a
separate shipment. The incremental cost of adding a check to a regular shipment
to a nearby correspondent was probably negligible. Note also that settlement
was probably less costly through established correspondent relations. Conse-
quently, the latter was almost certainly less costly than direct presentment for
a bank holding a check drawn on a country bank. Critics of pre-Fed check
clearing implicitly attribute to the wayward check all of the common cost of
the shipment to the correspondent.58
The bank deciding where to send an item would not consider the costs
incurred by the next bank to hold the check. The next bank could send it on to
another correspondent, which could send it on again to one of its correspon-
dents, and so on. Could this lead to excessively costly check routes? From a
social point of view, the correct cost comparison is between the expected cost
of sending the check along to the next correspondent bank (including the cost
of sending it to subsequent correspondents) and the cost of a more direct route.
Again, there is no reason to believe that the expected cost of indirect routing
was not almost always less than that of direct routing of irregular interregional
checks. The fact that some items ended up following routes that look exces-
sively costly ex post does not mean that routing choices were inefﬁcient ex
ante.
Some mistaken routing choices were inevitable in a decentralized system
with thousands of banks. The average costs of such mistakes constitute a valid
part of the social cost of the pre-Fed system. The mere existence of such costs,
however, does not imply inefﬁciency for the system as a whole. Only if the costs
of the decentralized system exceeded the costs of creating a centralized system
would inefﬁciency be implied. None of the critiques of the pre-Fed system has
presented evidence on this dimension.59 Evidence that it is possible to reduce
some collection costs is not, by itself, conclusive evidence that an alternative
arrangement would be superior. Yet as implied in the comments by Carter
58 A possibility we do not pursue here is that the cost of postage does not represent the
social cost of mailing checks. Since postage rates, then as now, are uniform across destinations, it
is quite likely that postage on the irregular country checks in question was lower than incremental
social cost, in the sense that the total postal revenue on shipments to the country bank’s location
failed to cover the incremental cost of service to that location. This would provide yet another
reason to question the cost comparison implicit in the circuitous routing evidence. It would also
cast doubt on the social value of the movement to shift to direct mail presentment as opposed to
direct presentment by an agent such as an express company.
59 There appear to be no available estimates of the frequency of such circuitous routing.
Cannon (1900), Hallock (1903), and Spahr (1926) cite only eight examples between them. Re-
ferring to the Sag Harbor check, James (1998, p. 144) notes that “Given the paucity of other
examples, one might be suspicious of this example’s general applicability.”       
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Glass above, to build an alternative system that reduces the costs associated
with collecting certain checks would itself be costly. Similarly, some pre-Fed
writers, such as Cannon (1900) and Hallock (1903), used evidence on the costs
of collecting country checks to argue for the value of creating and operating
a country clearinghouse. As noted above, the frustratingly slow pace of such
efforts suggests that the costs of creating a country clearinghouse exceeded the
available cost savings.
If the status quo was efﬁcient, why was there so much dissatisfaction with
it? Here, it is important to note that complaints about the system are almost
entirely voiced from the point of view of city banks. It was argued that the cost
of collecting country checks was too high, and it was widely acknowledged
that a par collection system would reduce the earnings of the nonpar country
banks.60 In other words, par collection would reduce net costs for city banks
and raise net costs for nonpar country banks. The complaints of the city banks
seem to have been driven by dissatisfaction with the allocation of costs implied
by the status quo arrangements, rather than by dissatisfaction with aggregate
cost.61
What city banks wanted was for presentment through the mail to have
parity with direct presentment, in which case the paying bank would be ob-
ligated to pay at par, without deducting a presentment fee. Such a regime
would have inevitably shifted costs toward country banks and away from city
banks. Although city banks were generally unable to obtain par presentment
legislation, the Federal Reserve Board ultimately granted that right to Reserve
Banks by regulatory ﬁat.
7. THE FED’S ENTRY INTO CHECK CLEARING
RECONSIDERED
According to the conventional view, self-evident inefﬁciencies motivated and
rationalized the Fed’s entry into the check collection industry. The process in-
volved a struggle between a progressive reform effort and the vested interests
of nonpar banks. Our alternative view suggests a very different interpretation
60 Most of Spahr’s (1926, pp. 240–43) “arguments for par collection” amount to claims that
costs borne by collecting city banks could and should be reduced. For example, he argues that
par collection under the Federal Reserve would “relieve trade . . . of the burden” of clearing costs
because “the costs would fall to the Federal Reserve Banks and reduce to that extent the earnings
that go to the government” (Spahr 1926, p. 240). That is, the government should defray collecting
bank costs.
61 City banks’ complaints about the costs of collecting country checks should also be viewed
in the context of secular trends in the structure of the banking industry. The total number of banks
in the country grew from 12,424 in 1902 to 26,765 in 1914, and many of these new banks were
small country banks (U.S. Treasury, Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency 1903, 1915). Thus
there were a growing number of country banks to contend with.      
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of the process by which the Fed entered the check collection industry. In our
view, the motive was to attract membership, and the process involved a struggle
over the allocation of the common costs of check collection.
All national banks were required to join the Federal Reserve System, but for
state-chartered banks, membership was optional. From the beginning, attracting
members, and their reserve balances, was viewed as critical to the success of
the institution (White 1983, p. 130). A key perceived defect of the previous
system was the “pyramiding” of reserves in ﬁnancial centers, which left the
latter vulnerable to sudden widespread withdrawals. Through rediscounting the
Reserve Banks would provide an elastic supply of balances in response to rapid
demand shifts, preventing ﬁnancial panics (White 1983, pp. 63–125).
In this context, the Reserve Bank check clearing service authorized by the
Act could help attract members, as the early leaders of the Federal Reserve
clearly understood. A mid-1915 report to the Reserve Bank Organizing Com-
mittee spelled out the link between Reserve Bank check clearing services and
the membership question:
It must be borne in mind that the banking power of the United States will di-
vide more sharply than it has ever done before into two groups—members and
non-members. It is the intent of the Act itself to bring non-members into the
system. But so long as there is any considerable body of non-member banks,
the two groups will of necessity be in competition with one another, producing
two parallel clearing systems....(T)he domestic exchange business of the
Federal reserve system must be so arranged as to offer constant inducements
to non-members to enter the system. At the same time, members must ﬁnd it
more proﬁtable to use the Federal reserve system than to make collections as
at present. The situation is more complex when it is taken into consideration
that member banks are in a position to deal on favorable terms either with the
Federal reserve banks and their members or with non-members.62
The Fed’s check clearing service should aim to reduce costs to members and
attract nonmembers to join the system. To do so, they would need to attract
the check clearing business of their members, who were under no obligation
to clear through the Fed.
The reserve requirements in the Federal Reserve Act, while essential to the
monetary goals of the Act, made it more difﬁcult to attract members. Prior to
the founding of the Fed, banks kept reserves with correspondents in addition to
specie and notes in their vaults. Correspondent balances could be used to satisfy
legal reserve requirements, up to a limit, under state laws and the National Bank
Act (Watkins 1929, pp. 67, 96). Moreover, correspondents would often grant
62 Preliminary Committee on Organization (1914, pp. 58–59). The organizing committee
consisted of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture.
The Preliminary Committee on Organization reported to them and was chaired by H. Parker
Willis.       
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immediate credit for deposited checks, and these counted toward the respon-
dent’s required reserves. Under the Federal Reserve Act, reserve requirements
had to be met with balances held at the Reserve Banks; correspondent balances
would no longer count. If the Reserve Banks did not offer check clearing
services, member banks would have to hold separate correspondent balances
in order to clear checks, and these balances would have a higher opportunity
cost, since they would no longer do double duty. Willis (1923, p. vi) described
the implications in dramatic terms:
It was recognized that, without these powers, [referring to Reserve Bank check
clearing authority] the reserve banks would become merely the holders of dead
balances carried for the member banks without any service to them; and, since
the business public abhors an idle or unnecessary institution, just as nature is
traditionally said to abhor a vacuum, it would not submit long to the needless
burden created by such emergency institutions designed to put out ﬁnancial
ﬁre.
Failure to offer attractive check clearing services to justify member bank reserve
balances would threaten support for the System.63
The reserve requirement provisions of the Federal Reserve Act were to
be phased in over three years, so the System had time to develop a strategy.
According to the original Act, member bank required reserves would be trans-
ferred over from correspondents in annual steps from November 16, 1914, to
November 16, 1917.64 These provisions were revised by the amendments of
June 21, 1917, in connection with measures to aid ﬁnancing of the government’s
war effort, lowering the requirements but making them effective immediately.65
The Fed’s struggle to establish its check clearing service is readily under-
standable from our alternative perspective. The ﬁrst national check clearing
venture, the “voluntary reciprocal plan” initiated by the Board in March 1915,
was unsuccessful, never attracting more than a third of the member banks. In
exchange for agreeing to accept mail presentment at par, member banks were
able to clear at par on members that joined. This was essentially a voluntary
clearinghouse, modeled after the city clearinghouses. That it failed should be
no surprise, given the terms that were offered. Reciprocal par presentment
allocates common costs according to each bank’s outlays. This allocation suc-
cessfully attracts members where the cost of over-the-counter presentment is
low, as among city banks. In this case, a bank joining the scheme gives up little
in presentment fee income. But where over-the-counter presentment costs are
63 Stevens (1998) also discusses the role of reserve requirements in the evolution of the
Fed’s check clearing activities.
64 Starting on November 16, 1914, correspondent balances could count towards a maximum
of 6/15 of required reserves in the ﬁrst year, 5/15 the second year, 4/15 the third year, 3/15 the
third year, and not at all after November 16, 1918.
65 The Board gave banks until July 15, 1917, to comply (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1917, pp.
508–09).      
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high and banks have the right to charge for remittance outside the scheme, this
allocation of common costs may fail to induce participation; some prospective
members would have no incentive to join, even if their participation would be
worthwhile. Two-thirds of member banks apparently did not want to join under
the reciprocal par presentment cost allocation. Some might have brought large
beneﬁts to the other participants in the scheme by lowering presentment costs,
even though they themselves placed a relatively low value on participation. As
we noted above, these are just the types of banks that charge presentment fees.
The Fed needed to ﬁnd a way to induce their participation.
With its second venture, the “compulsory” plan, the Fed found a solution
to the problem: under Circular No. 1 (May 1, 1916), members were required
to accept mail presentment at par. Having failed to induce more than a third
of their members to voluntarily give up charging presentment fees against the
Reserve Banks, the Fed prohibited such fees outright. The compulsory plan was
more attractive to members than the voluntary-reciprocal plan on two counts.
First, the Reserve Banks were offering to clear checks on any member bank,
regardless of how many member banks joined the scheme. The Reserve Banks
immediately had over 7,000 par endpoints. Second, the cost of joining the
second plan was much lower for many banks. Under the previous plan they
would have had to give up presentment fees. Under the new plan, the Board had
already taken away their right to charge presentment fees against the Reserve
Banks. Joining was less of a sacriﬁce now.
Success was not yet assured. In about a year, reserves would be transferred
over from correspondents to the Reserve Banks under the new reserve require-
ments. As we noted above, correspondent balances were a key component of
the bundle of mutual clearing services that made up the typical correspondent
banking relationship. Settling cleared checks by crediting or debiting correspon-
dent balances was less costly than remitting specie or exchange drafts. Members
would need to retain some correspondent balances to clear checks on nonmem-
bers, and such balances would no longer do double duty as required reserves.
The new reserve requirements would break apart some of the shared common
costs built into pre-Fed correspondent banking arrangements, raising member
bank costs.66 The Fed’s strategy now was to rebuild that cost sharing around
member bank balances at Reserve Banks. The objective was to offer to collect
at par checks drawn on every bank in the country.67 In theory, member banks
would no longer need external correspondent balances, the Reserve Banks hav-
ing taken over all the essential clearing functions connected with them.
To this end, the Board sought the amendments passed on September 7,
1916, allowing Reserve Banks to clear checks drawn on nonmembers. But the
66 Martin, et al. (1915, pp. 369–70).
67 “Any clearing and collection plan to be effective must be so comprehensive as to include
all checks” (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1917, p. 100).      
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Reserve Banks had trouble getting nonmember banks to accept presentment at
par, as one would expect; the Reserve Banks had nothing of value to offer in
exchange. This led the Board in early 1917 to seek amendments allowing the
Reserve Banks to accept checks deposited by nonmembers. Perhaps reciprocal
check clearing privileges would entice nonmembers to give up their present-
ment fee income. By early 1917, however, the Board’s ban on presentment
fees against the Reserve Banks made clear that check collection costs would
be reallocated as a by-product of the Fed’s strategy to eliminate presentment
fees. Bankers who would be disadvantaged by such a reallocation mobilized
to push the Hardwick Amendment. The resulting legislative battle exposed the
divergent interests in the allocation of check collection costs. The Hardwick
Amendment was effectively defeated following a “nationwide campaign . . . by
the Credit Men’s Association, the mail-order houses, manufacturers, jobbers,
wholesalers and merchants in the large centers.”68 Payees, in other words,
lobbied in favor of shifting costs towards payor banks.69
An ensuing opinion by the Attorney General spelled out the new distri-
bution of property rights.70 Reserve Banks could not pay presentment fees.
Nonmember banks could decide for themselves whether to charge fees, but
assessing fees against a Reserve Bank for mail presentment was the equivalent
of not accepting mail presentment from them. In this environment, the Reserve
Banks attempted to exercise as much leverage as possible to persuade nonmem-
bers to pay at par. During the period from early 1919 through 1923, the Reserve
Banks resorted to a number of costly collection techniques, such as sending
Reserve Bank employees to present over the counter or hiring local agents to
make direct presentation. These were characterized in litigation as outside the
bounds of customary banking practice; in many cases the expenditures on such
techniques exceeded the presentment fees that were avoided and thus would
not have been undertaken by private sector collecting banks.71 The list of
banks accepting par presentment was naturally largest in the presence of such
measures. When court decisions struck them down, Reserve Bank leverage was
commensurately reduced and the par list shrank.
68 “The Hardwick Amendment” (1917, p. 40). See also Tippetts (1929, pp. 272–74).
69 Note that costs were shifted to taxpayers as well, since the Fed stopped recovering its
costs when collection fees were eliminated in June 1918 (Spahr 1926, pp. 192–93).
70 Federal Reserve Bulletin (1918, pp. 367–70).
71 Spahr (1926); Tippetts (1929).      
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8. CONCLUSION
The Reserve Banks were able to achieve what reformers had been unable to
bring about—a more centralized clearing of interregional checks. Although
early reform-minded writers, like Cannon (1900) and Hallock (1903), had ar-
gued that the cost savings from eliminating what they saw as inefﬁciencies in
clearing irregular interregional checks would exceed the cost of setting up a
more centralized arrangement, no such schemes had emerged. The Fed suc-
ceeded where earlier efforts failed, under our alternative view, because the
Board arrogated the right to present at par on member banks. No such unilateral
ability to reallocate property rights was available to private sector collecting
banks. Reallocating property rights had the effect of shifting the common costs
of check collection away from collecting banks that used the Reserve Bank
system, toward member banks and, after fees were eliminated in 1918, toward
federal taxpayers.
The par presentment right granted to the Reserve Banks by the Board
in Circular No. 1, Series of 1916 (now Regulation J), is essentially a barrier
to competition in the sense that it allows the Reserve Banks to offer check
collection services at lower costs than competitors. Other banks could obtain
the right to present at par, but they would have to offer paying banks material
compensation in order to do so. The Reserve Banks did not need to offer any
compensation. Note that this barrier to competition persists today in the form
of differential presentment times (Lacker and Weinberg 1998). Private sector
collecting banks must present by 8:00 a.m. in order to obtain same-day funds
(at par), while Reserve Banks can present until 2:00 p.m. for same-day funds;
the Reserve Banks have a “six-hour monopoly.” Interestingly, the Board of
Governors recently revisited the presentment time differential.72 The statement
announcing the Board’s decision to retain the competitive advantage notes that
any equalization would reallocate costs in a way that would be disadvantageous
to some segment of the industry. Moving the private presentment time later,
for example, would make collecting banks better off and paying banks worse
off.73 Ironically, the Fed’s original entry into check collection appears to have
been accomplished by reallocating the common costs of check collection in
just this fashion.
72 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1998).
73 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1998, p. 12).    
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